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Sammendrag. Det grønne skiftet: regulering, omstillingsdynamikk og intertemporale 
effekter 
Bedrifter bruker tid til å tilpasse seg nye reguleringer som krever arbeidere med ny kompetanse eller 
utskiftning av maskiner og bygninger. Dette er relevant både for hvordan regulering virker og for 
hvordan regulering bør utformes. I dette essayet undersøker jeg temaet med utgangspunkt i 
virkemiddelbruk og omstilling av elektrisitetssektoren på veien mot lavutslippssamfunnet. 
En dynamisk modell viser at annonsering av nye utslippsskatter har tre effekter på utslipp allerede før 
skattene innføres: 
1. Økt produksjon av begrensede fossile ressurser som olje og gass. Dette skjer fordi de 
fremtidige skattene reduserer verdien i å spare resursene for senere produksjon. Ergo er det 
mer gunstig å utvinne mer nå. Denne mekanismen refereres gjerne til som det «grønne 
paradokset».  
2. Redusert etterspørsel etter fossilt brensel. De annonserte skattene øker kostnaden ved å 
forbrenne kull og gass i fremtiden. Dette gjør det mindre gunstig å vedlikeholde eller investere 
i fossile varmekraftverk og senker dermed etterspørselen etter fossile brensler.  
3. Økt tilbud av elektrisitet fra relativt rene energikilder. Utslippsskattene vil gjøre fossil 
kraftproduksjon dyrere i fremtiden, hvilket innebærer at relativt ren energi blir mer 
konkurransedyktig. Dette gjør investeringer i blant annet fornybar energi mer attraktivt. Det 
økte tilbudet av ren elektrisitet reduserer konsumet av elektrisitet fra utslippsintensive 
varmekraftverk.  
Mens (1) er en tilbudssideeffekt som drar i retning av økte utslipp, er (2) og (3) 
etterspørselssideeffekter som bidrar til å redusere utslippene. Fra et teoretisk ståsted er det dermed 
tvetydig om annonsering av fremtidige skatter vil øke eller senke dagens utslipp. Numeriske 
simuleringer gir imidlertid sterke indikasjoner på at (2) og (3) dominerer (1), dvs. at utslippene vil 
falle.  
Dersom bedriftenes forventninger om fremtidige priser er adaptive, dvs. at høyere priser i dag gir 
forventninger om høyere priser fremover, bør utformingen av miljøskatter ta hensyn til dette. Det 
innebærer at investeringer i forurensende varmekraftverk skattlegges, mens investeringer i relativt rene 
kraftverk subsidieres. Det viser seg imidlertid at adaptive forventninger og relativt høye priser under 
omstillingen fra fossil til ikke-fossil energi kan medføre at investeringsbeslutningene i ren 
produksjonskapasitet baseres på for optimistiske forventninger om fremtidige priser. Dette gir i så fall 
overkapasitet, for eksempel i form av at for mange fosser legges i rør. For å forhindre dette kan en 
skattlegge også disse investeringene. Alle investeringsskattene kommer i tillegg til en skatt på utslipp 
og er kun nødvendige i en overgangsfase. 
Analysen viser at virkemiddelbruken på veien mot lavutslippssamfunnet bør annonseres tydelig og 
være forutsigbar, da annonseringen i seg selv har effekt og stor verdi. Et effektivt grønt skifte vil 
gjerne kreve en kombinasjon av skatter/subsidier på investeringer i en overgangsfase. Skattlegging av 
utslipp kommer i tillegg.  
1 Introduction
A power plant or vehicle may operate for decades before it is obsolete. Con-
sequently, adaptation to new regulatory policies will be sluggish. This is
particularly relevant when the regulator wants to induce substantial changes
in the economy, like in the case of climate change (see, e.g., IPCC, 2015).
In this paper, I examine regulation in the presence of adjustment costs and
resource scarcity, allowing for imperfect agent foresight. I focus on climate
change and time persistent fossil fuel consumption patterns. Specifically,
I assume that firms face convex investment costs, implying that the cost
of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increases with the speed of
emission reductions.
My first research question explores transition dynamics under subopti-
mal environmental policy; i.e., does announcement of future emission taxes
decrease current emissions in the presence of resource scarcity and adjust-
ment costs? Anticipated future emission taxes have three effects on early
emissions:
(a) Increased current supply of fossil fuels. Future taxes decrease the fu-
ture value of the fossil fuel resource. Hence, it is profitable to move
extraction forward in time. This is the well-known (weak) green para-
dox (see, e.g., Sinclair 1992; Sinn, 2008; Gerlagh, 2011).
(b) Reduced demand for fossil fuels. Future taxes increases the future cost
of combusting fossil fuels. This reduces the profitability of investment
in, e.g., coal fired power plants, and thereby the demand for coal.
(c) Increased supply of low emission fuel substitutes. Future emission
taxes increase future residual demand for low emission energy. This
increases the profitability of investment in, e.g., renewable energy and,
thereby, the supply of renewable energy to the market. This reduces
the consumption of fossil fuels.
Whereas (a) increases the supply of fossil fuels, (b) and (c) reduce the de-
mand for fossil fuels. Hence, it is a priori ambiguous whether the market
equilibrium will feature increased or decreased fossil fuel consumption, as
compared to the case without future taxes. Section 3 presents numerical
results which suggest that the demand side dynamics (b) and (c) strongly
dominate the supply side dynamic (a).
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The regulator faces a trade-off in the presence of adjustment costs: On
the one hand, fast emission reductions reduce environmental damage from
global warming. On the other hand, the cost of emission reductions can
always be reduced by extending the time horizon over which emission re-
ductions take place. Furthermore, environmental policy has the dynamic
effects (a) to (c) mentioned above. My second research question is: Should
Pigouvian taxes be adjusted in the presence of adjustment costs and resource
scarcity?
Standard Pigouvian taxes induce the socially optimal time trajectory
if firms have perfect information about the future. This is not surprising,
because the firms then perfectly internalize their future adjustment and
resource scarcity costs. But what if the firms are less than perfectly informed
about future prices and taxes? To examine this, I let expectations be a linear
combination of rational and adaptive expectations.1 That is, the firms’
beliefs about future producer prices (including producer taxes) is a mix
between (i) expectations under perfect foresight and (ii) expectations based
on a weighted mean of past observations, with less weight on observations
further back in time.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that the presence of adaptive expec-
tations induces excess inertia; i.e., that the emission tax must be above the
Pigouvian tax level in order to induce efficient transition towards the low
emission economy. The rationale is that the firms’ investment decisions are
based on price expectations that depends on the fossil fuel based economy.
Hence, a tax above the Pigouvian level is needed to spur shut-down of emis-
sion intensive power plants and investment in low emission energy sources.
The answer turns out to be somewhat more complex, however.
Firstly, the optimal time trajectory cannot, in general, be implemented
with a tax on emissions alone. The reason is that we have three poten-
tial market failures: the negative externality related to emissions, erroneous
scarcity rents in the firms’ decisions involving extraction of exhaustible re-
sources, and erroneous investment decisions. The first two market failures
can be corrected for by a production tax consisting of two elements: a
Pigovian tax on emissions and a shadow price element correcting for the
1See Muth (1961), Lucas (1987) and Sheffrin (1996) about rational expectations. See
Friedman (1957) and Sargent (1999) about adaptive expectations. Chow (1989; 2011)
presents econometric evidence in favor of adaptive expectations, as opposed to rational
expectations.
5
erroneous resource rent. The third market failure requires a tax on invest-
ment.
Secondly, the presence of adaptive expectations does not necessarily im-
ply excess inertia. The reason is that the clean energy producer price evolves
non-monotonically during the transition towards the low emission economy.
Clean energy producer prices increase initially, because of higher residual
demand for clean energy when the supply of emission intensive energy is
taxed. Thereafter, the producer prices decrease as the economy adjusts to-
wards the new equilibrium. Specifically, the production capacity of relatively
cheap clean energy replaces the taxed and, hence, more costly emission in-
tensive energy. It follows that adaptive price expectations may be too high
during the transition, implying overinvestment in clean energy production
capacity and emissions below those of the optimal time trajectory. In the
numerical simulations, adaptive expectations induce excess inertia if and
only if expectations react sufficiently sluggishly to new information about
prices and taxes. One reason for this result is that the clean energy ‘pro-
ducer price spike’ that occurs after introduction of emission taxes does not
affect the firms’ beliefs about future prices as strongly if the adaptive ex-
pectation formation process is sluggish. The numerical analysis suggests
that the optimal tax on investment in clean energy sources is first negative
(subsidy), then positive and slowly declining towards zero. Producer prices
on emission intensive energy declines monotonously during the transition
towards the low emission economy. The optimal tax on investment in emis-
sion intensive production capacity is therefore positive and slowly declining
towards zero.
Thirdly, the optimal tax on scarce resources is below marginal environ-
mental damage if producer prices are monotonously decreasing. The reason
is that the firms’ adaptive producer price expectations are above the ac-
tual future prices if prices are declining, implying a too large absolute value
scarcity rent. Conversely, the optimal production tax is above marginal envi-
ronmental damage if producer prices are monotonously increasing. It follows
that the optimal production tax on scarce emission intensive resources tend
to be below the Pigouvian tax level during the transition towards a low
emission economy, because the transition period features declining producer
prices for emission intensive goods. After the transition period, however,
resource scarcity implies gradually increasing consumer prices (in the ab-
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sence of technic change). This implies taxation above the Pigouvian level
in the long run, unless environmental damage increases sufficiently fast to
induce declining producer prices (consumer price minus emission tax). The
standard Pigiouvian tax is optimal on production that does not involve ex-
haustible resources.
Last, a uniform tax does not ensure cost efficiency unless all firms have
the same beliefs about the future. The reason is that the perceived shadow
prices on production and investment may differ across the firms.
The presence of adjustment costs was early recognized; both related
to firms’ net capital investment decisions (Lucas, 1976; Gould, 1968) and
related to changing the number of employees (Holt et al., 1960; Oi, 1962).
Capital adjustment costs arise, e.g., if the price of capital increases in the
rate of investment. Labor adjustment costs include costs related to hiring,
training and layoff. These are all relevant sources for the adjustment costs
modelled in the present paper. In the empirical literature, development
of models approximating adjustment costs by including lagged dependent
variables led to sharp increases in econometric performance (Koyck, 1954;
Hall and Jorgenson, 1976). The role of non-convexities and irreversibilities
are highlighted by, e.g., Abel and Eberly (1996) and Power (1998). There
is a substantial literature on exhaustible resources with foresighted resource
owners (Hotelling 1931; Heal, 1976), including regulatory issues and the
green paradox (Sinclair, 1992; Sinn, 2008).2
Section 2 features the theoretical analysis. The numerical Section 3 is
included to substantiate selected results and model dynamics. Section 4
concludes.
2 Theoretical analysis
Let the vector xt =
(
x1t , x
2
t , ..., x
i¯
t
)
denote a representative consumer’s con-
sumption bundle of goods i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., i¯} in period t ∈ T = {1, 2, ..., t}.
The associated benefit is given by the increasing and strictly concave utility
function u (xt). I assume market clearing such that production of x
i
t equals
consumption of xit for all i ∈ I and t ∈ T . One interpretation of this model
setup is an economy which uses energy at decreasing returns to scale, and
2See also Shapiro (1986), Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), Caballero and Engel (1999),
Hall (2004), and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) about adjustment costs. See Hoel (2012)
and Jensen et al. (2015) for more about the green paradox.
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where energy may be derived from i¯ sources: coal, gas, hydropower, and
so forth. The discount factor is given by δ ∈ (0, 1] and all derivatives are
assumed to be finite.
Let Y it and X
i
t denote representative firm (or sector) i’s time t production
capacity and cumulative production (over time), respectively. I assume that
the supply (or production) cost of xit is given by:
ci
(
xit, X
i
t , Y
i
t
)
= ki
(
xit
)
+ f i
(
xit − Y it
)
+ hi
(
Xit
)
xit, ∀i. (1)
Here ki (·) is a convex and strictly increasing function (standard cost function
part), f i (·) is strictly convex with minimum at f i (0) = 0 (adjustment cost
function part), and hi
(
Xit
)
is an increasing function with minimum function
value equal to zero (resource scarcity function part); see details below. I
assume that supply cost ci(·) increases in xit such that ∂ci (·) /∂xit ≡ cix(·) ≥ 0
around optimum.3 Note that the representative firms represent the whole
supply chain, including potential resource extraction (mechanisms (a) to (c)
in the introduction are internalized by the firm).
The function f i(·) implies that it is costly to produce at a level that
differs from capacity Y it ; e.g., because of overtime payments, idle capacity
or use of costly reserve capacity. I assume that production capacity evolves
following the state equation:
Y it+1 = βY
i
t + y
i
t, Y
i
0 = Y
i
, (2)
where yit is capacity investment, β ∈ (0, 1] is a capital depreciation factor
and Y¯ i is initial capacity (a constant determined by history). The capacity
measure Y it may be interpreted as a proxy for minimum efficient scale for
production of good xit.
I let investment costs κi(yit) be a strictly convex function with minimum
at κi(0) = 0. The cost of increasing production capacity may consist of
building new plants, hiring workers or developing infrastructure. These
costs may increase substantially in the presence of economy wide capacity
constraints, like limited availability of skilled labor or raw materials.4 The
3The results may be generalized to the case where the cost of producing the different
goods depend on each other, given appropriate restrictions on the cross-derivatives.
4For example, the modern-day gold rush of oil companies and contractors converging
on western Canada’s oil-sands markets bogged down as high materials costs and out-
stripped labor resources forced project delays and budget overruns around the year 2007;
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model framework allows the firm to actively reduce capacity faster than
capital depreciation (yit < 0). The adjustment costs in this case represent,
e.g., capital costs associated with hastened fossil fueled power plant shut-
down or lay-off of workers. The strict convexity of f i (·) and κi (·) implies
that the adjustment costs associated with any given change in x may be
reduced by increasing the number of time periods during which the change
occurs. Specifically, the cost of reducing GHG emissions increases with the
speed of emission reductions.
The convex and non-decreasing function hi
(
Xit
)
captures potential re-
source scarcity related to production of xit; i.e., unit cost may increase with
cumulative production.5 The state equation for Xit is:
Xit+1 = X
i
t + x
i
t, X
i
0 = X¯
i, ∀i, (3)
where X¯i is a constant.
Let ς =
(
ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζ i¯
)
be a vector of emission intensities associated with
production (or consumption) of xit. Total emissions at time t is then the
scalar product ςx′t (x′t is the transpose of xt). I assume that the emissions
stock evolves following the state equation:
St+1 = αSt + ςx
′
t, S0 = S¯ (4)
where S¯ is a constant determined by history and α ∈ [0, 1) denotes the stock
depreciation factor from one period to the next. Environmental damage from
emissions depends on current and historic emission levels and is given by
d (ςx′t, St), where d(·) is weakly convex and increasing in both arguments.6
see http://www.enr.com/articles/29338-oil-sands-boom-extracts-toll-on-costs?v=preview
5Cost that increases with accumulated extraction is frequently used in the resource
literature; see, e.g., Heal (1976) and Hanson (1980). As pointed out by Hoel (2012), this
specification can approximate the case with a fixed resource stock X˜ by assuming that
h (X) = % for X < X˜ and h (X) → ∞ for X ≥ X˜, where % is a fixed unit extraction
cost. The framework does not include elements like, e.g., technological progress and new
discoveries.
6Whereas stock damage is most relevant for carbon and sulfur dioxides, I allow for
associate emissions that causes flow damages. For example, coal plants also emit nitrogen
oxides and particulate matter which causes smog.
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2.1 The socially optimal time trajectory
A benevolent social planner maximizes welfare solving:
W = max
xt,yt
∑
t∈T
δt−1
[
u (xt)− d
(
ςx′t, St
)−∑
i∈I
[
ci
(
xit, X
i
t , Y
i
t
)
+ κi
(
yit
)]]
,
(5)
subject to equations (1) to (4) and with no constraints on the state vari-
ables in the last period.7 The maximization is carried out with respect to
all i ∈ I. Welfare in (5) is measured as the present value of utility from con-
sumption net of environmental damages, production costs and investment
costs. I assume that the social planner has perfect information to derive
the socially optimal time trajectory. This allows for comparative analyses
of optimal taxes and transition dynamics under various assumptions about
the representative firm’s knowledge about the future.
Before I present the solution to (5), it is convenient to define the following
variables:
λi,zt = −δ
r=t¯∑
r=t+1
(βδ)r−t−1 f iY
(
xi,zr − Y i,zr
)
, ∀i,∀t < t¯, (6)
µi,zt = −
t∑
r=t+1
δr−thiX
(
Xi,zr
)
xi,zr , ∀i,∀t < t¯, (7)
γzt = dςxz′t
(
ςxz′t , S
z
t
)
+ δ
r=t∑
r=t+1
(αδ)r−t−1 dS(ςxz′t , Sr)r, ∀t < t (8)
with λi,z
t¯
= µi,z
t¯
= 0, γzt¯ = dςxz′t¯
(
ςx′zt¯ , S
z
t¯
)
and z = {∗; t, rat; t, ada}. Su-
perscript z indicates three different time trajectories: the socially optimal
trajectory (∗), the competitive equilibrium time t rational expectations path
(t, rat), and the competitive equilibrium time t adaptive expectations path
(t, ada) (the paths t, rat and t, ada are derived in Section 2.2 below).
The variable λi,∗t is a shadow price representing the change in future
welfare caused by a marginal increase in current capacity Y i,∗t . In the case
where optimal production capacity declines towards a new and lower level,
higher capacity today induces higher future adjustment costs and longer
7That is, Xit , Y
i
t and St are endogenously determined by the intertemporal optimization
problem.
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transition time. Hence, the shadow price λi,∗t is negative. Conversely, λ
i,∗
t
is positive if optimal capacity shifts upwards. µi,∗t is the shadow price on
cumulative production. It is negative in the case of an exhaustible resource,
because higher current production then increases future production costs
and decreases future welfare. Finally, γzt is the present value of the environ-
mental damage caused by one unit of emissions at time t ∈ T . Note that the
expression for γzt is the sum of marginal current flow damage and present
value marginal future stock damage. I will henceforth refer to γzt as the
social cost of carbon. We have the following result (yt =
(
ycleant , y
dirty
t
)
):
Lemma 1. The socially optimal sequence pair {x∗t ,y∗t } solving (5) subject
to equations (1) to (4) satisfies:
∂u (x∗t ) /∂x
i
t ≤ cix(xi,∗t , Xi,∗t , Y i,∗t )− µi,∗t + ς iγ∗t , ∀i,∀t,
λi,∗t = κ
i
y
(
yi,∗t
)
, ∀i,∀t,
with Y i,∗t , X
i,∗
t , S
∗
t , λ
i,∗
t , µ
i,∗
t and γ
∗
t given by equations (2), (3), (4) (6), (7)
and (8), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 states the well-known result that current marginal utility from
consumption equals the sum of marginal production cost (including the
shadow price µi,∗t ) and marginal environmental damage (the emission in-
tensity times the social cost of carbon, ς iγ∗t ). We see from Lemma 1 that
production xi,∗t tend to be lower if the resource is scarce, or if the environ-
mental damage associated with xit is high. Further, marginal investment
cost equals the shadow price on capacity λi,∗t along the socially optimal time
trajectory. Otherwise, the social planner could increase present value welfare
by changing the investment level.8 I examine the dynamics of the socially
optimal time trajectory in the numerical Section 3.
2.2 The competitive equilibrium time trajectory
Let pit, τ
i
t and ϕ
i
t denote consumer prices on x
i
t, producer taxes on x
i
t, and
investment taxes on yit, respectively (a producer tax is equivalent with an
8We have λit < (>)0 if capacity Y
i declines (increases) over time. The first order
condition for yit then states that κ
i
y (·) < (>)0, implying that yit < (>)0 because κi (·) is
strictly convex with minimum at κi (0) = 0.
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emission tax in this model setup without abatement). A negative tax in-
dicates a subsidy. In competitive equilibrium, a price-taking representative
consumer maximizes net utility solving:
xt = arg max
xt
[
u (xt)− ptx′t
]
, ∀t, (9)
where pt =
(
xcleant , x
dirty
t
)
and with associated first order condition ∂u (xt) /∂x
i
t =
pit for all i ∈ I.
The competitive representative firm i maximizes the present value of
profits over the remaining time horizon:
V it = max
xi,ts ,y
i,t
s
∑
s=t,t+1,...,t¯
δs−t
[(
pi,t,es − τ i,t,es
)
xi,ts − ci
(
xi,ts , X
i,t
s , Y
i,t
s
)− (κi (yi,ts )+ ϕi,t,es yi,ts )] , ∀t
(10)
subject to equations (1) to (3) and with no constraints on the state vari-
ables in the last period. The solution to the dynamic optimization problem
(10) depends on the firm’s expectations about future prices and taxes. Su-
perscript t, e denotes a period t expectation in (10). We have pi,t,et = p
i
t,
τ i,t,et = τ
i
t and ϕ
i,t,e
t = ϕ
i
t, because the firm can observe current prices and
taxes. The period t solution to (10) specifies a time trajectory over the
remaining periods s = t, t+ 1 . . . , t¯. This trajectory is updated the next pe-
riod if the firm receives new information about producer prices or investment
taxes.
Two prominent approaches for modeling expectations are adaptive ex-
pectations and rational expectations.9 I assume that the firm’s decisions
which influence the future are based on forecasts that are linear combinations
of adaptive expectations and perfectly rational expectations. More precisely,
the competitive equilibrium shadow prices µi,t,ct and λ
i,t,c
t are linear combi-
nations of the shadow prices associated with the trajectories that solves (10)
under adaptive and perfectly rational expectations in each period t ∈ T . In
the rest of Section 2.2, I first derive these two time trajectories. Then I
combine them to model the behavior of a firm with potentially imperfect
knowledge about future prices. Last, I derive the competitive equilibrium.
I model adaptive expectations such that the current expectations about
9I use the well-known terms ‘rational expectations’ and ‘adaptive expectations’ even
though the model abstracts from uncertainty .
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each future price or tax equals the expectation in the previous period plus an
‘error-adjustment’ term. This adjustment term raises (lowers) the current
expectation if the realized current value turned out to be higher (lower)
than expected. The adaptive expectations time t belief about period t + n
(n ∈ {1, 2, ..., t¯− t}) is given by:
χi,t,adat+n = χ
i,t−1,ada
t + ϑ
(
χi,ct − χi,t−1,adat
)
, s.t. χi,0,ada1 = χ¯
i, ∀i, (11)
where χi,t,adat+n =
{
pi,t,adat+n − τ i,t,adat+n , ϕi,t,adat+n
}
, ϑ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant that de-
termines the speed of the error correction adjustment, χi,ct is the realized
value in competitive equilibrium (observed in period t), and χ¯i is a constant
determined by history. The adaptive expectations satisfy a weak form of
consistency in the sense that χi,t,adat+n converges towards the true value χ
i,c
t+n
if all elements in
{
χi,ct
}
remain constant over a sufficiently large time inter-
val. The convergence is only asymptotic unless ϑ equals unity. The adaptive
expectations time t control
{
xt,adas ,y
t,ada
s
}t¯
s=t
solves (10) subject to equa-
tions (1) to (3) and (11). I show in Appendix A that the period t solution
is:
pi,t,adas − τ i,t,adas ≤ cix
(
xi,t,adas , X
i,t,ada
s , Y
i,t,ada
s
)
− µi,t,adas , ∀i,∀t, (12)
λi,t,adas ≤ κiy
(
yi,t,adas
)
+ ϕi,t,adas , ∀i,∀t,
with s = t, t+ 1, . . . , t¯, shadow prices λi,t,adas and µ
i,t,ada
s given by equations
(6) and (7), respectively, and producer prices and taxes given by:
pi,t,adas − τ i,t,adas =
pit − τ it if s = t,(1− ϑ)t (p¯i − τ¯ i)+ ϑ∑tk=1 (1− ϑ)t−k (pik − τ ik) if s > t,
(13)
ϕi,t,adas =
ϕit, if s = t,(1− ϑ)t ϕ¯i + ϑ∑tk=1 (1− ϑ)t−k ϕ¯ik if s > t,
for all i ∈ I. The expected producer prices (s > t) in equation (13) solve the
difference equation (11). The interpretations of the shadow prices µi,t,adas and
λi,t,adas are similar to that of the socially optimal shadow prices µ
i,∗
t and λ
i,∗
t
given in Section 2.1 above, except that the firm has adaptive expectations
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about the future and cares about future profits instead of welfare. Note
that the equations system (2), (3), (6), (7), (12) and (13) characterizing the
adaptive expectations time t trajectory only features current and historic
prices and taxes of which the firm has perfect knowledge. Hence, current
production and investment is independent of future producer prices along the
adaptive expectations trajectory. Investment and, hence, future capacity,
increases in historic producer prices along the adaptive expectations path.
Note that the adaptive expectations path (12) only differs from the social
planner’s solution given in Lemma 1 wrt. the shadow prices λi,ts and µ
i,t
s ,
given the consumer’s first order condition to (9) and a Pigouvian tax equal
to the social cost of carbon τ it = ς
iγt.
I now turn to the rational expectations time t control
{
xt,rats ,y
t,rat
s
}t¯
s=t
,
which is given by the solution to (10) subject to (1) to (3) under perfect
foresight. I show in Appendix A that the period t solution to this optimal
control problem is given by:
pi,t,rats − τ is ≤ cix
(
xi,t,rats , X
i,t,rat
s , Y
i,t,rat
s
)− µi,t,rats , ∀i,∀t, (14)
λi,t,rats ≤ κiy
(
yi,t,rats
)
+ ϕis, ∀i,∀t,
with s = t, t + 1, . . . , t¯. The shadow prices λi,t,rats and µ
i,t,rat
s in (14) are
given by equations (6) and (7), respectively. The rational expectations path
induces the socially optimal outcome if the regulator implements a Pigovian
tax on emissions (i.e., if τ it = ζ
iγt, and given equation 9). Importantly,
current production and investment increase in future producer prices along
the rational expectations trajectory. The formulation in (14) assumes that
taxes are fixed (the perfectly informed social planner does not need to re-
optimize).
I assume that all firms always have perfect information about the current
state of the system. Hence, the adaptive and rational expectations time t
actions,
(
xi,t,adat , y
i,t,ada
t
)
and
(
xi,t,ratt , y
i,t,rat
t
)
, only differ with respect to
variables that depends on the future prices and taxes; i.e. the shadow prices
λi,zt and µ
i,z
t (for given initial conditions in period t). I let the representative
firms’ shadow prices in competitive equilibrium (denoted with superscript
c) be linear combinations of the shadow prices under the perfectly rational
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expectations path and the trajectory associated with adaptive expectations:
λi,t,cs = ψλ
i,t,rat
s + (1− ψ)λi,t,adas , ∀i,∀t, (15)
µi,t,cs = ψµ
i,t,rat
s + (1− ψ)µi,t,adas , ∀i,∀t,
with ψ ∈ [0, 1] and s = t, t + 1, . . . , t¯. Hence, the representative firms’
investment decisions and scarcity considerations are based on a mix between
rational and adaptive expectations. Specifically, ψ = 1 corresponds to the
case of perfect information, whereas ψ = 0 amounts to perfectly adaptive
expectations. Equation (15) may alternatively be interpreted as modelling
an economy with two types of firms within each sector: one with perfectly
rational expectations and one with perfectly adaptive expectations. Here,
the economy capacity constraints apply to the whole sector producing good
xi, and the parameter ψ determines the relative size of the rational firm
type.
We have the following result:
Lemma 2. The competitive equilibrium sequence pair {xct ,yct}, solving (10)
subject to equations (1) to (3) and (9), and with shadow prices being a linear
combination of the adjoints associated with perfectly adaptive and perfectly
rational expectations as specified in (15), satisfies:
∂u (xcs) /∂x
i
s − τ is ≤ cix
(
xi,cs , X
i,c
s , Y
i,c
s
)− µi,t,cs ,
λi,t,cs ≤ κiy
(
yi,cs
)
+ ϕis,
with s = t, t + 1, . . . , t¯; Xi,cs and Y
i,c
s given by equations (2) and (3), re-
spectively; and where µi,t,cs and λ
i,t,c
s solves equations (6), (7) and (12) to
(15).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The control sequence
{
xt,cs ,y
t,c
s
}t¯
s=t
is a function of the current prices
and state variables. This allows the firm to update its trajectory based
on the latest available information about the current state of the system;
i.e.,
{
xt,cs ,y
t,c
s
}t¯
s=t
is a closed-loop or Markov control. With perfectly rational
expectations (ψ = 1) there is no need to re-optimize, because the firm
perfectly forecasts the future. I will henceforth omit superscript t at s = t
to simplify notation when convenient (i.e., we have µi,t,ct ≡ µi,ct and so forth).
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The shadow price on capacity λi,ct depends positively on expected future
production levels (cf. equations 6 and 15). Further, the adaptive part of
the representative firm’s expectations formation causes expectations to lag
the actual values whenever ψ < 1 and
{
pit − τ it
}
is monotonic; i.e., the firm
tends to overestimate future producer prices if
{
pit − τ it
}
is decreasing, and
to underestimate future producer prices if
{
pit − τ it
}
is increasing. There-
fore, we tend to have λi,∗t ≤ λi,ct if prices are decreasing (and will continue
to decrease for a sufficiently long period ahead). Conversely, we tend to
have λi,∗t ≥ λi,ct in periods with increasing prices. Because investment de-
pends positively on λi,ct (cf. Lemma 2), the competive equilibrium features
dynamics where periods with high prices and overinvestment are followed
by periods with low prices and underinvestment, which again induce high
prices and overinvestment, and so forth. The price oscillations decrease over
time if taxes τ is and ϕ
i
s are constant.
The shadow price on cumulative production µi,zt also depends positively
on expected future prices (cf., equations 7 and 15). That is, a period with
relatively high prices will increase the adaptive price expectations of the
firms utilizing a scarce resource as input factor in their production (given
ψ < 1). The isolated effect of the associated increase in the shadow price
is to conserve more of the resource for future use. Conversely, periods with
low producer prices tend to feature low absolute value scarcity rents and,
hence, stimulate little conservation of the exhaustible resource. I examine
the dynamics of the competitive equilibrium trajectory in the numerical
Section 3.
2.3 The green paradox revisited
There is an extensive literature about intertemporal effects induced by fu-
ture environmental policies; see Section 1. In particular, Sinclair (1992) and
Sinn (2008) caution against environmental policies that becomes more strin-
gent with the passage of time, because such policies will accelerate resource
extraction and, thereby, accelerate global warming. The explanation is that
increasing taxes decreases the future value of the fossil fuel resource, mak-
ing it profitable to move extraction forward in time (cf., a lower absolute
value on µi,ct for fossil fuels in Lemma 2). The green paradox suggests that
the potential for environmental policies to curb global warming is limited at
best.
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In the following, I will use a distinction between a weak and a strong kind
of green paradoxes introduced by Gerlagh (2011). The weak green paradox
arises when early emissions increase in response to future environmental
policies, because fossil fuel owners accelerate production when the future
value of the resource stock drops. The strong green paradox arises when the
intertemporal adjustment of the resource owners increases not only early
emissions, but also the present value of total environmental damages.
We have the following result:
Proposition 1. Let the economy be described by the competitive equilibrium
in Lemma 2, with ψ > 0, I = {clean, dirty}, ζdirty > 0, ζclean = 0 and
hcleanX (·) = 0. Assume interior solutions such that xit > 0 for i ∈ I and t ∈
T . Let the two goods be substitutes in consumption (∂2u (·) /∂xcleant ∂xdirtyt <
0). Consider a credible announcement at t = 1 about future emission taxes
τdirtyu > 0 for all u = {v, v + 1, ...t¯} (v ∈ T \ {1}). We then have the
following:
(a) Let f i (·) = 0 (∀xit) and hdirtyX (·) > 0. Then xdirty,ct increases whereas
xclean,ct decreases for all t < u (weak green paradox).
(b) Let f i (·) 6= 0 (∀xit 6= Y it ) and hdirtyX (·) = 0. Then xdirty,ct decreases
whereas xclean,ct increases for all t > 1 (opposite of green paradox).
(c) Let f i (·) 6= 0 (∀xit 6= Y it ) and hdirtyX (·) > 0. Then either a) or b)
above occurs, depending on which of the opposing mechanisms that
dominates. In either case, there is an increase in xdirty,c1 and a decrease
in xclean,c1 .
Proof. The proposition follows from Lemma 2.
An increase in xdirty,ct in Proposition 1 implies increased emissions. An-
nouncement of future taxes has no effect on current emissions in the case of
purely adaptive expectations (ψ = 0).
Part a) in Proposition 1 is the well-known (weak) green paradox (Sin-
clair, 1992; Sinn, 2008). This holds in the case with resource scarcity and
no adjustment costs.
Part b) in Proposition 1 is the case with adjustment costs and no re-
source scarcity. In this case, announcing a future emission tax will reduce
early dirty production and emissions. The explanation is that the shadow
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price on the dirty good production capacity decreases if a future tax is an-
nounced. The associated lower investment reduces production capacity and,
thereby, dirty good production and emissions (cf., a lower λdirty,ct in Lemma
2). The exception in the first period occurs because capacity operates with
a one period lag in this model (cf., equation 2). Whereas the importance of
this lag is negligible if T is measured in short time periods, e.g, months or
quarters, it is not unreasonable that it takes some time before the effects of
altered investment decisions influence production and emissions. Further-
more, Proposition 1 b) states that anticipation of future emission taxes will
affect production of the clean good. The reason is that the clean good firm
knows that residual demand for the clean good will increase when the future
tax on the dirty good is implemented. Hence, the value of the clean good
capacity stock increases. The firm starts investing in the first period because
of convex capacity investment costs (cf., a higher λclean,ct in Lemma 2). Part
b) in Proposition 1 is relevant for the majority of environmental policies.
Examples include non-fossil energy sources and perhaps coal (which exists
in abundance), or dirty versus clean manufactured or agricultural goods. We
observe that the dynamic effects in part b) help to decrease early emissions
even before the tax is implemented (but after it has been announced).
Part c) in Proposition 1 adds the two mechanisms in parts a) and b)
together. The case with both adjustment costs and resource scarcity is
relevant for environmental policies that targets emissions from oil and gas.10
Whereas the resource scarcity dynamics put forward by the green paradox
suggest that exhaustible fossil fuel extraction accelerates following signaling
of future environmental policies, the adjustment cost dynamics explored in
the present paper have the opposite effect. From a theoretical point of
view, it is therefore a priori unknown whether current emissions increase
or decrease following signaling of stringent future climate policy, given that
agents are foresighted and that resource exhaustibility and adjustment costs
are present. The numerical results in Section 3 suggest that the capacity
constraint mechanisms explored in the present paper strongly dominate the
supply side mechanism put forth by the green paradox literature.
So far, we have focused on intertemporal effects induced by suboptimal
taxation. I now turn to the issue of optimal taxation in the presence of
10There are generally significant capital investment costs related to extraction of oil and
gas (see, e.g., IEA 2016, p. 144-160).
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adjustment costs and potentially imperfect firm foresight.
2.4 Optimal taxation in the presence of adjustment costs
and imperfect knowledge about future prices
In Section 2.2 we found that the competitive equilibrium is characterized by
alternating periods of over- and underinvestment, and too little or too much
conservation of scarce resources. The optimal taxes must account for these
dynamics and correct for the negative environmental externality. We have
the following result:
Proposition 2. Let the economy be described by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Then the socially optimal time trajectory can be implemented in competitive
equilibrium by the following sequence of taxes:
τ i,∗t = ς
iγt + µ
i,c
t − µi,∗t , ∀i,∀t,
ϕi,∗t = λ
i,c
t − λi,∗t , ∀i,∀t < t,
Proof. The proposition follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Note that
µi,ct = µ
i,rat
t = µ
i,∗
t and λ
i,c
t = λ
i,rat
t = λ
i,∗
t when ψ = 1 and τ
i,∗
t = ς
iγt.
Proposition 2 implies that a standard Pigouvian tax on emissions induces
the socially optimal time trajectory if and only if expectations are perfectly
rational, i.e. we have τ i,∗t = ς iγt and ϕ
i,∗
t = 0 iff ψ = 1. If expectations are
partly adaptive, however, optimal taxation involves two additional ‘shadow
price elements’. These elements are an investment tax, λi,ct − λi,∗t , and a
resource conservation tax, µi,ct − µi,∗t . In the following, I will examine these
elements one by one.11
To simplify the discussion of the investment tax, consider the case with
no resource scarcity (hiX (·) = 0), partly adaptive expectations (ψ < 1)
and adjustment costs f i (·) 6= 0 (∀xit 6= Y it ). In this case, optimal policy
must correct for two sources of market failure: the negative environmental
externality and erroneous investment decisions caused by adaptive expecta-
tions. Whereas the Pigouvian tax corrects for the negative environmental
externality, the investment tax is still required to correct for the erroneous
11In a setting with abatement, such that emissions and production are decoupled, op-
timal taxation would involve an investment tax ϕi,∗t = λ
i,c
t − λi,∗t , a Pigouvian tax on
emissions τ i,pig∗t = ς
iγt and a conservation tax on production τ
i,cons∗
t = µ
i,c
t − µi,∗t .
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expectations. Interestingly, it turns out that over- or underinvestment cre-
ates negative externalities that extends beyond those related to the invest-
ing firms’ own emissions. To see this, consider the case with two substitute
goods I = {clean, dirty}. Assume that the dirty producer overinvests in ca-
pacity. This will have three consequences. Firstly, the dirty good producer
loses profits due excess investment costs and production capacity. Secondly,
residual demand for the clean good decreases, implying lower production and
less investment. Thirdly, high investment in dirty good production capacity
reduces current prices, and hence the clean producer’s adaptive expecta-
tions about future prices. Therefore, investment in dirty good production
capacity reduces the expected profitability from investment in clean good
production capacity and, thereby, reduces future clean good capacity and
production. This increases future emissions. By the same reasoning, un-
derinvestment in dirty good production capacity induces excess clean good
production capacity. Note that the absolute value of λit will be relatively
high during a transition phase, and relatively low when production is stable.
Therefore, the taxes or subsidies on investment ϕi,∗t will be small unless the
economy is in a transition phase.12
Regarding the conservation tax element, µi,ct −µi,∗t , Proposition 2 implies
that the optimal tax τ i,∗t is below (above) marginal environmental damage
if producer prices are monotonously decreasing (increasing) and ψ < 1. The
reason is that the firms’ adaptive producer price expectations are above (be-
low) the actual future prices if prices are declining (increasing), implying a
too large (small) absolute value scarcity rent. This implies that the conser-
vation tax element tends to be negative during the transition period, because
the producer prices are steadily declining as the economy adjusts towards
the low emission economy. After the transition has been completed, how-
ever, consumer prices start to increase due resource scarcity. If this causes
producer prices to increase, the conservation tax element will be positive in
the long run.
12The trajectories in Lemma 1 and 2 may have stationary states. If so, these are
characterized by: (i) no use of exhaustible resources; (ii) no stock pollution (α = 0 or
dS (·) = 0) or that the quantity of pollution added to the emissions stock in each period
is equal to the amount that depreciates (so that net stock accumulation is zero) and; (iii)
that the firm’s expectations are correct. The expectations only approach the true value
asymptotically unless ψ = 1 and/or ϑ = 1 (cf. equation 11). If existing, the stationary
states along the competitive and socially optimal trajectories are equal if and only if the
optimal taxes given by Proposition 2 is implemented.
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Corollary 1 examines the relationship between the long run conservation
tax element and the environmental damage function:
Corollary 1. Assume one good I = {carbon} with negligible adjustment
costs (λcarbont ≈ 0), resource scarcity (µcarbont < 0) and (at least partly)
adaptive expectations (ψ < 1). Then we have:
(a) Production of xcarbont should be taxed above marginal environmental
damage (τ carbon,∗t > ςcarbonγt) if marginal environmental damage from
emissions is non-increasing over time (γt+1 ≤ γt, ∀t).
(b) Production of xcarbont should be taxed below marginal environmental
damage (τ carbon,∗t < ςcarbonγt) if marginal environmental damage from
emissions increases sufficiently fast over time (γt+1  γt, ∀t).
Proof. The corollary follows directly from Proposition 2.
The first part of Corollary 1 is valid in the case of no environmental damage
(d(·) = 0), or if environmental damage increases sufficiently slowly over time.
The explanation is that the firm producing carbon does not fully internalize
the increase in the consumers’ marginal utility from consumption of xcarbon
induced by the aggravating future resource scarcity. Hence, the regulator
increases the current tax to conserve some of the exhaustible resource for
future use. Note that the producer price must increase over time for the first
part in Corollary 1 to apply.13 The second part of Corollary 1 relates to the
case where producer prices pit−τ it decrease over time. This occurs if marginal
environmental damage from emissions increases sufficiently fast over time. In
this case, the producer’s adaptive price expectations are too high, implying a
too high resource rent and, consequently, excess conservation of the resource.
Intuitively, it is better to extract a larger share of the resource today if future
marginal environmental damage is high.
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal taxes τ i,∗t and ϕ
i,∗
t depend on
the firms’ beliefs about future prices. How does this affect cost efficiency if
we momentarily relax the assumption about one single representative firm
producing good i? We then have the following result:
13It is straightforward to show that part (a) in Corollary 1 may be negated by technic
change; i.e. the conservation tax element is negative if technic change dominates resource
scarcity in the long run (such that producer prices declines).
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Corollary 2. Let there be j ∈ J = {1, 2, ..., j¯} = firms producing good i ∈ I.
Then the optimal tax is uniform if and only if ψi,j = 1 for all firms, or if
ψi,j and ϑi,j are both equal across firms (∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J and ∀t 6= t).
Proof. Different expectations about the future implies different shadow prices
(cf. Lemma 2). The corollary then follows from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2 states that a uniform tax across heterogeneous agents can
induce the socially optimal path only if firms have equal expectations about
the future. Indeed, even ‘static cost efficiency’, in the sense of equal marginal
supply costs across firms in period t < t, cannot be guaranteed. The intu-
ition is straightforward: the forward-looking firm’s current production end
investment decisions depends on the shadow price on production and in-
vestment, which again depends on the firms’ expectations about the future.
If the shadow prices differ across firms, equal tax rates cannot ensure that
marginal supply costs are equalized across firms (cf., Lemma 1). Corollary
1 implies that market based regulatory instruments, like uniform taxes or
tradable quantity regulation, cannot ensure cost efficiency unless expecta-
tions about the future are equal across all firms.
3 Numerical analysis: Regulating the U.S. elec-
tricity market
According to the White House, the United States intends to roughly double
its pace of carbon pollution reduction, from 1.2 percent per year on average
during the period 2005-2020 to 2.3-2.8 percent per year on average between
2020 and 2025. This target is grounded in analysis of cost-effective carbon
pollution reductions achievable under existing law and will keep the U.S. on
the pathway to achieve deep economy-wide reductions of 80 percent or more
by 2050.14
In this numerical illustration, I consider an 80 percent reduction in CO2
emissions generated by U.S. electricity production in 2050, as compared with
the 2015 emissions level. Below I give a brief non-technical description of
the numerical model. See Appendix B for further details.
14https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-
2025-emissions-target-unfccc.
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The United States generated about 4 thousand terawatt hours of electric-
ity in 2015, of which 33 percent came from coal plants, 34 percent from nat-
ural gas and petroleum, 20 percent from nuclear power and 13 percent from
renewables.15 This numerical illustration features electricity from these four
energy sources, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Electricity is a ho-
mogeneous good and I model electricity generated from the different sources
as perfect substitutes in consumption. Emission reductions are possible ei-
ther through abatement (CCS), lower electricity consumption, or through
substitution from fossil energy to renewables or nuclear energy. I assume a
discount rate equal to 3 percent per year. The numerical model runs over the
time horizon t = {2016, 2017, ..., 2215} and uses the Path solver in GAMS
(numerical software) to solve the systems of equations given in Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 as mixed complementarity problems.16 I let t¯ be large such
that the model approximates the infinite horizon solution for the reported
results.
I estimate electricity demand using yearly figures for U.S. electricity
consumption and prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) over the period 1990-2014, including U.S. GDP figures from the IMF
World Economic Outlook Database and fossil fuel prices from BP Statistical
Review of World Energy 2016 in the regression. I further assume that ki (·)
is convex such that, for each source, kix (·) equals the average of 1990-2014
real U.S. electricity prices at generation equal to 2015, and doubles at sup-
ply equal to total 2015 electricity consumption. Capital depreciation is set
to 0.6 percent per year.17 Regarding investment costs κi (·), I first calibrate
fuel specific adjustment cost factors based on investment cost figures from
IEA.18 Then I scale average investment costs such that it equals 25 times
the 2015 electricity price when all energy sources increases capacity with
10 percent of total 2015 electricity generation. The adjustment cost func-
tion f i (·) is calibrated such that marginal supply costs increaes with 105
15Petroleum constituted only 1%, whereas natural gas generated 33%. In the ‘renew-
ables’ category we have the following shares: Hydro = 6%, biomass = 1.6%, geothermal
= 0.4%, solar = 0.6% and wind = 4.7%. Figures are for net electricity generation. See
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3.
16See Dirkse and Ferris (1995) and ’http://www.gams.com/’ for information about the
Path solver and GAMS.
17Nadiri and Prucha (1993) estimates the depreciation rates for physical and R&D
capital in the U.S. manufacturing sector to 0.059 and 0.12, respectively.
18See ’https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/’
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USD per MWh (the U.S. average electricity price in 2015) when production
is 20 percent above minimum efficient scale. It is significantly less costly
to decrease capacity and to produce below minimum efficient scale than to
build new plants and produce above capacity in the model. Besides costs
related to investment in non-fossil electricity production capacity, and shut-
down of fossil fueled power plants, relevant adjustment costs may be power
grid investments and energy security issues related to renewable energy in-
termittency. Emission intensities are based on EIA figures for electricity
generation and emissions. I calculate the CCS emissions intensity under the
assumption that CCS plants reduce emissions with 90 percent, and that half
of the CCS plants combust coal and the other half combust gas.19 The only
modeled environmental damage externality is related to CO2 emissions, and
I assume that the U.S. government allows increased nuclear energy produc-
tion to replace fossil fuels. Last, the adaptive expectations producer price
forecast in 2015 is calculated based on historic electrity prices and equation
(11). See Appendix B for further details on the numerical model.
3.1 Current effects of future taxes
In this section, I examine how the U.S. electricity market responds following
announcement of future CO2 taxes. The tax is announced in the beginning
of year 2016. It is zero for the period 2016-2024 and 50 USD per ton CO2
thereafter. I assume perfectly rational expectations in Section 3.1 (ψ = 1).20
Figure 1 graphs the changes in net investment (investment minus capital
depreciation) induced by the tax announcement in the period 2016-2050. As
expected, investment in generation capacity from low emission sources (re-
newables, nuclear and CCS) increase when the tax is announced. The reason
is that future residual demand for electricity from low emission plants will
increase when the electricity from coal plants are taxed. In terms of Lemma
2, the emission tax induces a higher future producer price for low emission
plants, with an associated higher shadow price on capacity. Furthermore, it
is not profitable to invest in coal fired power plants in the face of the future
emission tax. Therefore, net investment is negative for coal.
Figure 2 shows changes in electricity production and emissions follow-
19CCS has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions from a coal or natural gas-fueled
power plant by 90 percent; see http://www.c2es.org/technology/factsheet/CCS
20ψ < 1 does not alter the qualitative results in Section 3.1.
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Figure 1: Effects of tax announcement on net investment. Tax minus no tax
simulation values. Tax is 50 USD per ton CO2 after 2024.
Figure 2: Effects of tax announcement on production and emissions. Pro-
duction by source (left axis) and total emissions (right axis). Tax minus no
tax simulation values. Tax is 50 USD per ton CO2 after 2024.
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ing announcement of the future tax, as compared to the case with no tax.
The lower capacity of coal fired power plants implied by the net invest-
ment graphed in Figure 1 causes early production and emission from coal
to decline. In addition, the increased capacity of low emission power plants
crowds out electricity from coal and gas fired power plants, also in the years
before the tax is implemented. The black line in Figure 2 shows the asso-
ciated decline in aggregate emissions. Reduced electricity generation from
coal account for 92 percent of the total emission reduction over the time
interval 2016-2050. Emissions decline in all periods, except for a minuscule
increase in 2016, which occurs because the adjustment cost mechanics oper-
ates with a one period time lag (cf., Proposition 1). Overall, the cumulative
decline in emissions over the period 2016-2024, i.e. before the tax is imple-
mented, constitutes 41 percent of total emissions in 2015. Even emissions
from gas and petroleum over the period 2016-2024 decline with 81 million
tons of CO2 in the tax simulation, as compared with the no tax simulation
run.
How sensitive are the result in Figure 2 with respect to the magnitude
of adjustment costs? In Figure 3, I multiply the model baseline adjustment
costs (κ (·)) and (f (·)) with φ ∈ {0, 0.2, ..., 2}. Here, φ = 0 is the case
with costless adjustment, whereas φ = 2 indicates that adjustment costs are
doubled. We observe that the numerical model reproduces the weak green
paradox if and only if adjustment costs are very low.21 Interestingly, even
emissions from gas and petroleum decreases in all sensitivity cases, except
for φ = 0. Note that larger adjustment costs have two opposing effects on
the change in emissions in Figure 3. One the one hand, higher adjustment
costs implies larger absolute value shadow prices on capacity, which pulls in
the direction of a stronger response to the future taxes. On the other hand,
higher adjustment costs in itself imply a weaker response (because it is more
expensive to change emission levels).
A sensitivity analysis with respect to resource scarcity did not yield the
weak green paradox; see Fig. 12 in Appendix B. Specifically, total emissions
over the period 2016-2024 remained significantly lower in the tax simulation
(as compared with the no-tax simulation) even when scarcity costs were
multiplied with five. U.S. electricity generation from gas and petroleum in
21It turns out that emissions during the period 2016-2024 are lower (higher) in the tax
simulation than in the no-tax simulation when φ is above (below) 0.06.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity wrt. adjustment costs. Effects of tax announcement
on production by source (left axis) and emissions (right axis) summed over
the 10 years before the tax is implemented. Tax minus no tax simulation
values.
2050 was reduced to a mere 84 TWh in the simulation without emission
taxes and five-fold resource scarcity parameter values. Note that higher
early gas production, caused by announcement of future emission taxes,
may crowd out electricity supply from emission intensive coal plants along
with electricity from low emission sources.
Last, the results are very robust to changes in initial production capacity
between energy sources. Specifically, emissions during the period 2016-2024
declines following tax announcement even when initial capacity is adjusted
such that all electricity in 2015 are generated from gas and petroleum fired
power plants. This suggest that emissions are likely to decline following
announcement of future taxes in other energy markets as well (i.e., besides
the U.S. market).
3.2 Transition dynamics under optimal versus Pigou taxes
In this Section I compare model dynamics under optimal taxes (cf. Propo-
sition 2) and standard Pigouvian taxes on emissions equal to the social cost
of carbon (henceforth referred to as a ’SCC tax’). I assume that ψ = 0
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Figure 4: Selected producer prices from 2015 to 2050. Optimal (*) and SCC
( scc) trajectories.
and ϑ = 1/2 in Section 3.2, implying that the firm’s expectations are per-
fectly adaptive with quite fast error correction (see Fig 10 in Appendix B).
I model CO2 emissions as a flow pollutant with constant marginal environ-
mental damage, such that the 80 percent reduction target is reached in 2050
along the socially optimal time trajectory. Constant marginal damage is a
reasonable approximation for a global pollutant like CO2.22
Figure 4 graphs selected producer prices over the period 2015 to 2050.
The taxes are introduced in 2016, which is the first year in the simulation
runs. The consumer prices are roughly one USD per MWh above the pro-
ducer prices for non-fossil energy (nuclear and renewables, which are one
top of each other in Figure 3) over the whole time horizon. The tax im-
plementation induces a sharp increase in the supply cost of electricity from
coal fired power plants in 2016. This also increases residual demand and,
hence, producer prices for electricity from low emission power plants. The
prices decrease after 2016, because increased generation capacity from non-
fossil energy sources replace the fossil fuels with relatively high supply costs
22See Appendix B for results with a stock pollutant with a yearly depreciation rate of
0.5 percent, implying a CO2 half-life of 139 years. The qualitative results presented in
Section 3.2 are not affected by the inclusion of stock dynamics.
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Figure 5: Selected shadow prices on capacity (line chart) and differences in
net investment levels (bargraph).
(because of the emission tax).
Whereas the prices decline steadily after 2016 along the socially optimal
time trajectory, prices in competitive equilibrium with adaptive expectations
and SCC taxes oscillate. The reason is that the adaptive price expectations
lags actual prices, which tends to cause too high shadow prices on capac-
ity in periods with decreasing producer prices, and too low shadow prices
in periods with increasing producer prices. These mechanics are revealed
in Figure 5, which graphs selected shadow prices and net investment levels
over the period 2016 to 2050. We observe that the low emission electricity
generation sources adjust their price expectations to the new and higher
price levels after around two years. Therefore, we have too little invest-
ment in low emission capacity in the first two simulation years. Further,
the firms do not foresee that the equilibrium prices will decrease as the
economy completes the transition towards the new low emission electricity
market. Consequently, the ‘short run’ dynamics under SCC taxes are char-
acterized by overinvestment in coal fired power plants, and an expansion of
low-emission generation capacity that catches up and ‘overshoot’ after two
years of underinvestment. The resulting excess capacity from all generation
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Figure 6: U.S. electricity production by source. Optimal (*) and SCC ( scc)
trajectories. Selected years.
sources causes the equilibrium prices to decline, and consumer prices un-
der the SCC tax are below those of the optimal tax in the ’medium run’
(i.e., rougly the 2020s and 2030s).23 In the ’long run’, the time trajectory
under SCC taxes converge towards the socially optimal path as the adap-
tive expectations converge towards the actual prices realized in competitive
equilibrium.
Figure 6 graphs electricity production levels by energy source under op-
timal taxes and SCC taxes in selected years, including historic EIA numbers
for the year 2015. The total present value welfare gain following implemen-
tation of optimal versus SCC taxes constitutes 32 percent of total supply
costs in 2015. The welfare effects are graphed in Figure 13 in Appendix B.
Whereas the presence of adaptive expectations implies that the transition
towards the low carbon economy under Pigouvian taxes is too slow in the
first years, the results are less clear in the slightly longer run (both in theory
and in the numerical model). The reason is that the adaptive expectations
adjusts slowly to the decreasing prices after the tax is implemented (see
23Note that these mechanics are related to the well-known cobweb model, where the
amount produced must be chosen before prices are observed, see e.g. Ezekiel (1938).
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Figure 7: Consumer prices and emissions in percent of 2015 US electricity
price and 2015 US emissions from electricty generation, respectively. Opti-
mal and SCC taxes with different values on the error correction parameter
ϑ.
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Figure 8: Optimal taxes on investment by energy source, ϕi,∗t .
figure 10 in Appendix B), implying a period with overinvestment in all fuel
sources (see Figure 5). Hence, it is possible for emissions during, e.g., the
first decade or two, to be either too high or too low under Pigouvian taxes.
Figure 7 graphs consumer prices and total emissions under optimal taxes and
SCC taxes, with various adaptive expectation error correction parameter
values. Whereas emissions under SCC taxes are above the optimal levels
with slow updating of price expectations (cf., ϑ = 0.1 in Figure 7), rapid
updating of beliefs (cf., ϑ = 1 in Figure 7) causes investments in low emission
technology to overshoot, with associated emissions below the optimal time
trajectory. The baseline simulation error correction parameter value (cf.,
ϑ = 0.5 in Figure 7) is somewhere in between. Hence, the role of the
optimal taxes given in Proposition 2 depends crucially on the expectations
formation process (11). Specifically, the role of the optimal taxes is to speed
up the transition towards the low carbon economy if and only if expectations
adjust slowly to new information.
The optimal taxes on investment in the baseline simulation, ϕi,∗t , are
graphed in Figure 8. Note that these taxes are not simply the difference
between the shadow prices on investment depicted in Figure 5, because
current taxes influence the firms’ expectations about future producer prices.
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Figure 9: Optimal tax on electricity from gas fueled power plants, τ gas,∗t .
The optimal investment taxes are positive (or close to zero) for all fuels in all
periods, except for a subsidy to low emission energy in the first simulation
year 2016. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the investment taxes are higher
for low emission energy after 2017. The reason is that these energy sources
experience a stronger discrepancy between expected and actual producer
prices than the fossil fuels coal and gas.
Figure 9 graphs the optimal production tax for electricity from gas fueled
power plants. We observe that the shadow price tax elements are negative
over the years 2016-2045, which is consistent with declining producer prices
and Proposition 2. The conservation tax elements are positive after 2045,
because resource scarcity induces slowly increasing producer prices in the
long run (cf., Corollary 2). The conservation tax elements are very small
for the other energy sources. Remember that the optimal taxes in figures
8 and 9 are sensitive to the assumptions about the adaptive expectations
formation process (11), cf. Figure 7.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examined regulation in the presence of adjustment costs, re-
source scarcity and potentially imperfect knowledge about future prices.
There are three main lessons two be learned. First, the results indicate that
announcement of future environmental regulation of electricity markets will
reduce current emissions. In short, whereas demand side dynamics induced
by adjustment costs indicate that future taxes reduces early emissions, the
supply side dynamics put forward by the green paradox literature suggests
an increase in early emissions. Whereas theory alone hence yields ambigu-
ous results, the demand side dynamics dominates the supply side dynamics
for all reasonable parametrizations of the numerical model. Second, the
socially optimal time path can be achieved with standard Pigouvian taxes
if and only if the firms have perfect knowledge about the future. If the
firms’ expectations are partly adaptive, optimal taxation includes a tax on
investment and, in the case of scarce resources, taxes that differs from the
Pigouvian emission tax. Third, the presence of adaptive price expectations
does not necessarily induce excess inertia in the transition towards a low
emission energy market. Indeed, the combined presence of adjustment costs
and adaptive expectations may induce overinvestment in clean production
capacity and emissions below the optimal time trajectory.
The theory predicts that forward-looking agents will reduce current con-
sumption of goods subject to stringent future regulation. In this respect, it is
interesting to observe the current struggle of publicly traded U.S. coal com-
panies.24 Clearly, there are several factors behind this, like slower economic
growth, cheap natural gas and current environmental regulation. Neverthe-
less, it seems reasonable that also bleaker prospects caused by future envi-
ronmental regulation and increasingly competitive renewable power partly
explains the investors’ vanishing interest in coal.25
Last, the paper features a stylized model framework and issues like
24According to Bloomberg (March 17, 2016), the combined market capitalization of
U.S. coal miners since 2011 has plunged from over $70 billion to barely $6 billion. In the
past two years, at least six U.S. coal-mining companies have filed for bankruptcy. Their
struggle to find rescue in the financial and capital markets underscores Wall Street’s
vanishing interest in coal companies (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-
16/coal-s-last-man-standing-dragged-to-the-brink-of-bankruptcy).
25The International Energy Administration (IEA) states, referring to the 2015 Paris
Climate Conference, that climate policy has emerged as a major driver for the future of coal
in large parts of the world (http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/mtcmr2015sum.pdf).
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commitment, uncertainty, network externalities, economic growth, techni-
cal change and general equilibrium effects are not included in the analysis.
It seems reasonable, however, to expect the basic mechanisms explored in
the present paper to remain present in a more general setting.
Appendix A: Proofs and derivations
Proof of Lemma 1. The benevolent social planner solves (5) s.t. equation
(1) to (4). The associated present value Hamiltonian is:
H∗ =

δt−1
[
u (xt)− d (ςx′t, St)−
∑
i∈I
(
ci
(
xit, X
i
t , Y
i
t
)
+ κi
(
yit
))]
+
∑
i∈I
(
λˆit
(
βY it + y
i
t
)
+ µˆit
(
X + xit
))
+ γˆt (αSt + ςx
′
t) , ∀t < t
δt−1
[
u (xt)− d
(
ςx′
t
, St
)−∑i∈I (ci (xit, Xit , Y it )+ κi (yit))]
.
where c(·) is given by (1), and λˆit, µˆit and γˆt are shadow prices on production
capacity, cumulative production (over time) and the emission stock, respec-
tively. The Maximum principle for discrete time optimization states that
the solution to (5) must satisfy the following necessary conditions for all
i ∈ I (see, e.g., Sydsæter et al., 2008, p. 445):
H∗xit = δ
t−1
(
uxit (x
∗
t )− cixit
(
xi,∗t , X
i,∗
t , Y
i,∗
t
)
− dxit
(
ςx∗′t , S
∗
t
))
+ µˆit + ζ
iγ∗t ≤ 0, ∀t,(16)
H∗yit = −δ
t−1κiyit
(
yi∗t
)
+ λˆi,∗t = 0 ∀t,
λˆi,∗t−1 = H
∗
Y it
= −δt−1f iY it
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
+ βλˆi,∗t , ∀t 6= t,
µˆi,∗t−1 = H
∗
Xit
= −δt−1hiXit
(
Xi,∗t
)
xi,∗t + µˆ
i,∗
t , ∀t 6= t,
γˆ∗t−1 = H
∗
St = −δt−1dSt
(
ςx∗′t , S
∗
t
)
+ αγ∗t , ∀t 6= t,
0 = λˆi,∗
t
= µˆi,∗
t
= γˆ∗t ,
where the last line is the transversality conditions for free state variables
Y i
t
, Xit¯ and St. The assumptions imposed on the cost function c (·) ensures
that the Hamiltonian is concave for all t ∈ T around optimum. Hence, the
necessary conditions (16) maximize W by Arrow’s Sufficient Theorem. Last,
the state movement equations (2), (3) and (4) must be satisfied along the
optimal trajectory.
The solution to λˆi,∗t−1 = −δt−1f iY it
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
+ βλˆi,∗t in (16) is λˆ
i,∗
t =
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λˆi,∗0
βt +
∑r=t¯
r=t+1
δr−1
βt−r+1 f
i
Y it
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
. The transversality condition λˆi,∗
t
=
0 then implies λˆi,∗0 = −
∑r=t¯
r=1 (βδ)
r−1 f i
Y it
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
. Inserting in the
equation for λˆi,∗t above yields λˆ
i,∗
t = −
∑r=t¯
r=t+1 δ
r−1βr−t−1f i
Y it
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
(t < t). The current value shadow price on capacity is then given by:
λi,∗t ≡
λˆi,∗t
δt−1
= −δ
r=t¯∑
r=t+1
(βδ)r−t−1 f iY ir
(
xi,∗t − Y i,∗t
)
, (17)
with γt = 0.
The solution to µˆi,∗t−1 = −δt−1hiXit
(
Xi,∗t
)
xi,∗t + µˆ
i,∗
t in (16) is µˆ
i,∗
t = µˆ
i,∗
0 +∑r=t
r=1 δ
r−1hi
Xir
(
Xi,∗r
)
xi,∗r for t < t. The transversality condition µˆi,∗t = 0
then implies µˆi,∗0 = −
∑r=t
r=1 δ
r−1h′
Xir
(
Xi,∗r
)
xi,∗r . Hence, we have µˆi,∗t =
−∑tr=t+1 δr−1h′Xir (Xi,∗r )xi,∗r (t < t). The current value shadow price on
cumulative production Xi,∗t is then given by:
µi,∗t ≡
µˆi,∗t
δt−1
= −
t∑
r=t+1
δr−th′Xir
(
Xi,∗r
)
xi,∗r , t < t, (18)
with µi
t
= 0.
The solution to γ̂∗t−1 = H ′St = −δt−1dSt(ςx∗′t , S∗t ) + αγˆt in (16) is γ̂∗t =
1
αt
γˆ0 +
∑r=t
r=1
δr−1
αt−r+1dSr(ςxr, Sr). The transversality condition γˆt = 0 then
implies γˆ0 = −αt
∑r=t
r=1
δr−1
αt−r+1dSr(ςxr, Sr). Inserting in the equation for γˆt
above yields γˆt = −
∑t
r=t+1 δ
r−1αr−t−1dSr(ςxr, Sr) (t < t). This is the
adjoint related to the emissions stock St in the maximization problem (5).
The solution in Lemma 1 is presented in terms of the marginal environmental
damage from current emissions (or social cost of carbon), however, which is
then given by:
γt ≡ d(ςxz′t )
(
ςxz′t , S
z
t
)
+
−γˆt
δt−1
= d(ςxz′t )
(
ςxz′t , S
z
t
)
+δ
r=t∑
r=t+1
(αδ)r−t−1 dS(ςxz′t , Sr)r, t < t,
(19)
with γt = d(ςxz′t¯ )
(
ςxz′t¯ , S
z
t¯
)
.
Inserting equations (17) to (19) in the first line in equation (16) yields
the socially optimal time trajectory in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. The representative firm maximizes the present value
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of profits over the whole time horizon, given its beliefs about future prices.
The period t Hamiltonian of firm i is:
H i,ts =

δs−1
[(
pi,t,es − τ i,t,es
)
xi,ts − ci
(
xi,ts , X
i,t
s , Y
i,t
s
)
−
(
κi
(
yi,ts
)
+ ϕi,t,es y
i,t
s
)]
+λˆis
(
βY i,ts + y
i,t
s
)
+ µˆis
(
Xi,ts + x
i,t
s
)
, ∀t < t,
δt−1
[(
pi,t,e
t¯
− τ i,t,e
t¯
)
xi,t
t¯
− ci
(
xi,t
t¯
, Xi,t
t¯
, Y i,t
t¯
)
−
(
κi
(
yi,t
t¯
)
+ ϕi,t,e
t¯
yi,t
t¯
)]
,
.
for all s ∈ ξt =
{
t, t+ 1, ..., t
}
. Note that the variables for the time t
trajectory have superscript t, because the trajectory is updated in the next
period unless ψ = 0 (or if the economy is in a stationary state and ϑ =
1). The system of necessary conditions is (the derivation is similar to the
derivation of the social planner’s time trajectory above):
pi,e,ts − τ i,e,ts ≤ cixis
(
xi,ts , X
i,t
s , Y
i,t
s
)− µi,ts , (20)
λi,ts ≤ κyis
(
yi,ts
)
+ ϕi,ts ,
λi,ts = −δ
r=t¯∑
r=s+1
(βδ)r−s−1 f iY it
(
xi,tr − Y i,tr
)
,
µi,ts = −
t∑
r=s+1
δr−shiXir
(
Xi,tr
)
xi,tr ,
which together with the state movement equations (2) and (3) is sufficient
for optimum by Arrow’s Sufficient Theorem (given the firm’s beliefs about
future prices and taxes). The sums over r are zero at t = t¯. Note that
the control sequence
{
xi,ts , y
i,t
s
}
s∈ξt
is a function of the prices pit, τ
i
tand ϕ
i
t
(including expectations about the future), and the state variables Xit and Y
i
t .
This allows the firm to update its trajectory based on the latest available
information about the current state of the system (i.e.,
{
xi,ts , y
i,t
s
}
s∈ξt
is
a closed-loop or Markov control). Market equilibrium requires that pit =
uxit
(
xit
)
in (20) along the competitive equilibrium path (cf. equation 9).
The rational expectations time t trajectory
{
xi,t,rats , y
i,t,rat
s
}
s∈ξt
solves
the maximization problem (10) subject to equations (2), (3) and (9) under
the assumption of perfect information about the future along the rational
expectations path (which coincides with the competitive equilibrium iff ψ1 =
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Figure 10: Producer prices in competitive equilibrium. Actual (c) and one
period ahead adaptive expectations (ada).
1) for all i ∈ I. The solution is given by (20), with perfect information about
future prices along the rational expectations path.
The adaptive expectations time t trajectory
{
xi,t,adas , y
i,t,ada
s
}
s∈ξt
solves
the maximization problem (10) subject to equations (2), (3) and (11). The
solution to (11) is χi,e,tt+n = (1− ϑ)t χ¯i + ϑ
∑t
k=1 (1− ϑ)t−k χi,ck . Hence, the
adaptive expectations trajectory is given by (20) with pi,e,ts −τ i,e,ts = (1− ϑ)t
(
p¯i − τ¯ i)+
ϑ
∑t
k=1 (1− ϑ)t−k
(
pik − τ ik
)
and ϕi,e,ts = (1− ϑ)t ϕ¯i + ϑ
∑t
k=1 (1− ϑ)t−k ϕ¯ik
for s > t. We have pi,e,tt = p
i
t, τ
i,e,t
s = τ it and ϕ
i,e,t
t = ϕ
i
t at s = t in (20); cf.,
equations (12) and (13) in the text.
We have to solve for the rational expectations trajectory and the adaptive
expectations trajectory in each period t < t¯ in order to find the current
competitive equilibrium production and investment levels, unless ψ = 1,
because the representative firm updates its beliefs about the future based
on the latest available information. Lemma 2 now follows from equations
(9) and (15).
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Appendix B: The numerical model
Let the set of goods be I = {coal, gas, nuclear, renewables, CCS}, such that
xit denotes U.S. electricity produced (and consumed) in year t ∈ T from en-
ergy source i, j ∈ I (j is alias). The utility function is given by u (xt) =
u1
(∑
i∈I x
i
t
) − (u2/2) (∑i∈I xit)2. The ’standard’ part of the cost function
is ki(xit) = c1x
i
t+
(
ci2/2
) (
xit
)2
, where c1 and c
i
2 are fuel specific calibrated pa-
rameters. The adjustment cost function is f i
((
xit − Y it
)
/12
(∑
i Y
i
t /5 + Y
i
t
))
=
gi(·) (ci4 + (1− ci4)Ci(·)),with gi (·) = (c3/2) ((xit − Y it ) /12 (∑i Y it /5 + Y it ))2
and Ci (·) = 1pi
∑
i∈I
[
arctan
((
xit − c5xit−1
)
/c6
)
+ 12
]
. Here c3 determines
the magnitude of the adjustment costs, ci4 is the share of adjustment costs
that is incurred when production is declining, c5 is the capital depreciation
factor, and c6 determines the shape of C
i (·). The function Ci (·) is derived
using the Cauchy cumulative distribution function. Note that Ci(·) ∈ (0, 1)
and increases steeply from near zero to near 1 around xit− c5xit−1 = 0, given
a low value on c6. Figure 11 graphs the adjustment costs used in the numer-
ical simulations. I use figures for proved U.S. coal and natural gas reserves
from BP Statistics 2016, along with conversion factors and energy content
from the Canadian National Energy Board to derive the resource scarcity
function hi
(
Xit
)
= ci7X
i
t .
26 I assume zero U.S. net imports of coal and gas,
and that all U.S. coal and gas resources are available for U.S. electricity
production. ci7 is calibrated such that supply costs of coal and gas doubles
when accumulated production Xit equals proven reserves (c
i
7 is zero for re-
newables and nuclear, and calibrated under the assumption that half of the
coal is available for CCS).
I estimate U.S. electricity demand based on yearly figures for U.S. elec-
tricity sales to ultimate customers and average yearly prices from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) over the period 1990-2014, in-
cluding GDP and the U.S. Henry hub gas price in the regression.27 I let the
26NEB: http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrg/tl/cnvrsntbl/cnvrsntbl-eng.html. BP:
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-
energy.html
27I use the following data sources: Electricity prices and consumption: Energy
Information Administration (EIA) (http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#sales);
U.S. GDP: IMF World Economic Outlook Database
(https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx); gas, oil
and coal prices: British Petroleum (http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html); wage index: U.S. social se-
curity administration (https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html); Interest rate:
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Figure 11: Calibrated adjustment and investment costs. f ix
(
xit − Y it
)
on the
left and kix
(
xit
)
on the right.
electricity price in this equation be endogenous and dependent on the U.S.
oil price (West Texas Intermediate) and the supply of electricity. The fitted
two equation system is: (i) Elcons = 1806− 2.99208 ∗Elprice+ 131.0206 ∗
GDP + 13.50116 ∗ Gasprice, and (ii) Elprice = 197.0943 − 0.0325257 ∗
Elcons+ 0.313119∗Oilprice. Here electricity consumption (Elcons) is mea-
sured in TWh, GDP is in trillions of USD (2014), electricity prices (Elprice)
are in USD (2014) per MWh, gas prices are in USD (2014) per million Btu,
and oil prices are USD (2014) per barrel. All variables are significant at
a 5 percent confidence level and the R2 values are 0.9864 and 0.8790 for
equations (i) and (ii), respectively. Note the negative sign on electricity
consumption (Elcons) in equation (ii). Alternative estimations featuring
the real interest rate, wage index and U.S. coal prices give very similar
results. One lag Dickey-Fuller unit root test suggests that U.S. energy con-
sumption and GDP are non-stationary (MacKinnon approximate p-values
are 0.37 and 0.73, respectively - the null hypothesis is unit root). However,
the one lag Dickey fuller test statistic on the regression residuals is -2.850,
implying that we can reject the hypothesis of unit root residuals at a 10 per-
cent confidence level (p-value is 0.0515). This suggests that U.S. GDP and
electricity consumption are cointegrated. I derive u1 and u2 from equation
(i). Environmental damage is given by d (ςx′t, St) = d1ςx′t + d2St +
d3
2 S
2
t .
Federal reserve (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm); Inflation:
(http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/).
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The derivation of the other parameters are described in Section 3. See Table
1 for exact parameter values.
The numerical model solves Lemmas 1 and 2 (extended to include cap-
ital deprecation), given these functional forms and parameter values. The
competitive equilibrium is solved as a ‘recursive loop’ over the years 2015,
2016, . . . ,2215. In this loop, the maximization problem (10) is solved for
t¯ − t = 200 in each year (i.e., t¯ = 2215 when s = 2016,t¯ = 2216 when
s = 2017,..., t¯ = 2415 when s = 2215). The initial conditions Y¯ i, Xi, S¯ and
χ¯i, in each loop year is determined by the previous year simulation.
Figure 10 graphs competitive equilibrium producer prices and the one
period ahead adaptive producer prices in the simulation run with SCC taxes.
Figure 12 graphs results from an sensitivity analysis wrt. resource scarcity.
Here the scarcity parameter ci7 is multiplied with 0, 1, ..., 5 for coal, gas and
CCS. The left hand side of Figure 13 graphs the model simulated welfare
effects following implementation of optimal taxes, compared to Pigou taxes.
I test the model fit by running the model against history from 1991 to 2015.
The right hand side of Figure 13 graphs model projections and historic
figures for the period 1991-2015. This simulation uses ψ = 1 and features
real figures for U.S. GDP and U.S. prices on coal and gas (captured by the
producer tax). The simulation is very rough and does not capture other
variables that may affect U.S. electricity generation. The simulation run
assumes that coal and gas prices remain at the 2015 level into the future,
and that future U.S. GDP grows at a rate equal to the average growth
rate during 1990-2015. We see that the simulation is unable to capture
dynamics between gas and coal induced by the shale gas revolution. Figure
14 replicates Figures 4 and 5 in the text in the case of a stock pollutant.
This simulation uses α = 0.995 (according to Hoel and Karp (2002), 0.5%
is widely accepted as an approximate point estimate for the decay rate for
greenhouse gasses), d1 = 1 and d2 = 0.0545/1000.
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Parameter\fuel Coal Gas Nuclear renewable CCS
ς i 1.011 .3986 .0052 .0052 .0705
xi0 1349 1388 531.4 817.5 1
ci1 42.98 40.62 68.3 78.8 94.3
ci2 .0381 .0387 .0319 .0294 .0226
ci4 0.1 0.1 1 0.1 0.1
ci6 105 105 0 0 105
ci7 7.4E-5 9.6E-4 0 0 1.4E-4
ki1 .963 .276 1.574 .841 1.346
ki2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1 0.2
Y¯ i 1348.8 1387.7 817.5 531.4 5
Parameter α δ ϑ ψ c3
Value .995 0.97 0.5 0 or 1 4.2E+5
Parameter c5 d1 d2 d3 k3
Value .994 73.4 0 0 1.0E-4
Parameter p¯i X¯i u1 u2
Value 103.2 1 705.5 .3342
Table 1: Parameter values in the numerical illustration.
Figure 12: Sensitivity wrt. resource scarcity. Effects of tax announcement
on production by source (left axis) and emissions (right axis) summed over
the 10 years before the tax is implemented. Tax minus no tax simulation
values.
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Figure 13: Left figure: Welfare effects. Optimal tax simulation values minus
Pigou tax simulation values. Right figure: Model fit to history. Electricity
generation by source. Model generated (dashed lines) and historic values
(unbroken lines).
Figure 14: Transition dynamics with a stock pollutant.
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